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Abstract—Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medi-
care Part D, we investigate whether health care utilization responds to the
dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance con-
tracts. We exploit the fact that because annual coverage usually resets every
January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial
(“spot”) price of health care but a higher expected end-of-year (“future”)
price. We find a statistically significant response of initial utilization to the
future price, rejecting the null that individuals respond only to the spot price.
We discuss implications for analysis of moral hazard in health insurance.
I. Introduction
THE size and rapid growth of the health care sector, andthe pressure this places on public sector budgets, has
created great interest among both academics and policymak-
ers in possible approaches to reducing health care spending.
On the demand side, the standard, long-standing approach
to constraining health care spending is through consumer
cost sharing in health insurance, such as deductibles and
coinsurance. Not surprisingly therefore, a substantial aca-
demic literature is devoted to trying to quantify how the
design of health insurance contracts affects medical spending.
These estimates have important implications for the costs of
alternative health insurance contracts and, hence, for the opti-
mal design of private insurance contracts or social insurance
programs.
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One aspect of this literature that we find remarkable is the
near consensus on the nature of the endeavor: the attempt to
quantify the response of medical spending with respect to its
(out-of-pocket) price to the consumer. For example, in their
chapter on health insurance in Handbook of Health Econom-
ics, Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) summarize about thirty
studies of the impact of insurance on health care utilization
that all report an estimate of “the” price elasticity of demand
for medical care (with respect to the out-of-pocket price). A
particularly famous and widely used estimate of this elastic-
ity is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment’s estimate of
−0.2 (Manning et al., 1987; Keeler & Rolph, 1988).
Why do we find this remarkable? Health insurance con-
tracts in the United States are highly nonlinear. Trying to
estimate the behavioral response to a single out-of-pocket
price is therefore usually not a well-posed exercise: It begs
the question, “With respect to which price?” In the context of
such nonlinear budget sets, trying to characterize an insurance
policy by a single price could produce very misleading infer-
ences. Consider, for example, an attempt to extrapolate from
an estimate of the effect of coinsurance on health spending
to the effect of introducing a high-deductible health insur-
ance plan. An individual who responds only to the current
“spot” price of medical care would respond to the introduc-
tion of a deductible as if the price has sharply increased to
100%. However, an individual who takes dynamic incen-
tives into account and has annual health expenditures that are
likely to exceed the new deductible would experience little
change in the effective marginal price of care and therefore
might not change his or her behavior much. Indeed, once
one accounts for the nonlinear contract design, even char-
acterizing which insurance contract would provide greater
incentives to economize on medical spending becomes a
complicated matter.1
In this paper we test whether individuals in fact take
dynamic incentives into account in their medical consump-
tion decisions. A fully rational, forward-looking individual
who is not liquidity constrained should take into account
only the future price and recognize that (conditional on the
future price) the spot price applied to a particular claim
1 Consider, for example, two plans with a coinsurance arm that is followed
by an out-of-pocket maximum of $5,000. Imagine that plan A has a 10%
coinsurance rate and plan B has a 50% coinsurance rate. Which plan would
induce less spending? The naive answer would be that plan B is less gener-
ous and would therefore lead to lower medical utilization. Yet the answer
depends on the distribution of medical spending without insurance, as well
as the extent to which individuals respond to the dynamic incentives cre-
ated by the nonlinear budget set. For example, an individual who suffers a
compound fracture early in the coverage period and spends $10,000 on a
surgery would effectively obtain full insurance coverage for the rest of the
year under plan B, but would face a 10% coinsurance rate (with a remaining
$4,000 stop loss) under plan A. We would therefore expect this individual
to have greater medical utilization under plan B.
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is not relevant and should not affect utilization decisions.
Yet although it is natural to expect that individuals should
respond to these dynamic incentives, there are at least three
reasons that individuals might not optimize with respect to
the entire nonlinear budget set. First, they may be affected
by an extreme form of present bias and behave as if they
are completely myopic, discounting the future entirely and
responding only to the current spot price of care. Second,
individuals may be affected by a host of potential behavioral
biases and may not be completely aware of, attentive to, or
understand the nonlinear budget set created by their health
insurance plan; it is plausible that in most situations, the spot
price that appears on the medical bill is much more salient.
Finally, individuals may factor in the future prices they will
face but be affected by the spot price due to liquidity con-
straints. Consider, for instance, a potential, nonemergency
$150 physician visit early in the coverage year. Even if the
individual expects medical consumption during the year to
eventually put him way above the deductible, he may find it
difficult to obtain the $150 that would be required to pay for
a nonemergency physician visit early in the year, while he is
still within the deductible range.
An ideal experiment for whether dynamic incentives mat-
ter in individuals’ medical utilization response to health
insurance would keep the spot price of care constant while
generating variation in the future price of care. Finding such
variation is empirically challenging, which may explain why
there has been relatively little work on this topic. The key
empirical difficulty arises because the spot price and the
future price often vary jointly. A low-spending individual
faces both a high spot price (because all her spending falls
below the deductible) and a high expected end-of-year price
(because she does not expect to hit the deductible), while the
opposite is true for a high-spending individual. Similarly, the
types of variation that have most often been used to estimate
the impact of health insurance on medical spending, such as
variation in deductibles or coinsurance rates, will change the
spot price and the future price jointly.
We propose, and implement, an empirical strategy that
approximates the ideal experiment, generating (arguably)
identifying variation in the future price of care, while holding
the spot price constant. Our strategy relies on the observa-
tion that typical health insurance contracts offer coverage
for a fixed duration and reset on prespecified dates, but they
generate identifying variation when they get applied to indi-
viduals whose initial coverage period is shorter. This practice
produces a relatively common situation in which similar
individuals face the same spot price for their consumption
decision but have substantially different expected end-of-year
prices. To see this, consider an annual health insurance con-
tract that runs from January 1 to December 31 and has an
annual deductible. It is common practice that when individ-
uals join the plan in the middle of the year, the deductible
remains at its annual level and applies only until the end of
the calendar year. As a result, those who join a plan later
in the year have fewer months to spend past the deductible
and thus face higher future prices. Initially, however, the spot
price is the same regardless of when the individual joined
the plan. Thus, all else equal, the expected end-of-year price
is increasing with the calendar month in which individuals
join a deductible plan, while the spot price is initially held
fixed.
Our primary analysis applies this empirical strategy in the
context of employer-provided health insurance in the United
States, the source of over 85% of private health insurance
coverage. We do so by comparing initial medical utilization
across individuals who join the same deductible plan in the
same firm but in different months of the year. To account
for potential confounders such as seasonality in health care
spending or seasonality in firm hiring, we use patterns of
initial utilization by join month for individuals who join
the same plan with no deductible, in which the future price
hardly varies over the course of the year. To operationalize
this strategy empirically, we draw on data from several large
employers with information on their plan details as well as
their employees’ plan choices, demographics, and medical
claims. Figure 1 (whose construction we describe in much
more detail later in the paper) provides one way of summa-
rizing this empirical exercise. It shows, separately for each
firm, that as employees join a plan later in the year (and the
expected end-of-year price rises for those in the deductible
plan), initial medical utilization in the deductible plan tends
to fall in both absolute terms and relative to the corresponding
pattern in the no-deductible plan. We will use this basic design
to present more formal analysis of a robust and statistically
significant decline in initial medical utilization associated
with a higher future price of medical care.
To further validate this finding and illustrate that it is not
specific to the particular firms and their employees whose
data we use, we also present an analogous finding in a dif-
ferent context and for a different population. Specifically,
we take advantage of the fact that individuals newly eligible
for Medicare, the public health insurance program for those
aged 65 and over, can enroll in a Part D prescription drug
plan in the month they turn 65, but the plan resets on January
1 regardless of when in the year they enrolled. Variation in
birth month thus generates variation in contract duration and
hence in expected end-of-year price among individuals in a
given plan in their first year, and serves the same empirical
purpose as variation in hire month did in our primary analy-
sis. Using this design, we find once again that a higher future
price is associated with a robust and statistically significant
decline in initial prescription drug purchasing. This section
of the paper also illustrates that the basic idea behind our
empirical strategy, which we view as one of the contributions
of the paper, is not unique to the specific data set we use but
can be exploited in multiple settings.
Overall, the results consistently point to the fact that indi-
viduals respond to the future price of care, thus rejecting
the null that individuals respond only to the spot price. That
is, it appears that individuals understand something about
the nature of their dynamic budget constraint and make their
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Figure 1.—Initial Medical Utilization by Join Quarter
All utilization measures refer to utilization by the employee and any covered dependents. Initial claims (left panels) are defined as any claims within the first three months, and initial spending (right panels) is defined
as the sum of all claim amounts of the claims that were made within the first three months. Expected end-of-year price is computed for the deductible plan only and corresponds to the end-of-year prices reported in
table 2. Sample sizes by plan and join quarter are reported in table 2.
health care utilization decisions with at least some attention
to dynamic considerations.
In the last section of the paper, we discuss some implica-
tions of these results for further work that aims to estimate
and interpret moral hazard in health insurance. Our find-
ings, while not necessarily surprising, should give pause to
researchers pursuing the currently common practice in empir-
ical work on moral hazard in health insurance of estimating
an elasticity of demand for medical care with respect to a
single price. They suggest that taking into account dynamic
incentives could be important for analyses of moral hazard
and that summarizing highly nonlinear contracts with a single
price could be prohibitively restrictive.
Yet an important limitation to our findings is that they fall
short of pointing to a specific behavioral model or to a set
of appropriate elasticities that would allow us to quantify
the response of medical utilization to changes in the (nonlin-
ear) contract design. In other words, while we have rejected
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the null that individuals respond only to the spot price, our
results do not necessarily imply that individuals respond only
to the future price; we think that it is plausible that both prices
could be important. With this in mind, in the last section, we
describe what we see as potentially constructive uses of our
findings for future work.
Our paper is related to several distinct literatures. Naturally
our paper fits in the large empirical literature that tries to esti-
mate moral hazard in health insurance or the price sensitivity
of demand for medical care. For this literature, our findings
highlight the importance of thinking about the entire budget
set rather than about a single price. This point was emphasized
in some of the early theoretical work on the impact of health
insurance on health spending (Keeler, Newhouse, & Phelps,
1977; Ellis, 1986) but until recently has rarely been incorpo-
rated into empirical work. Several papers on the impact of
health insurance on medical spending—Ellis (1986), Cardon
and Hendel (2001), and more recently, Kowalski (2012), Dal-
ton (2014), and our own work (Einav et al., 2013)—explicitly
account for the nonlinear budget set, but do so under the
(untested) assumption that individuals respond only to the
future price of care.2
Outside the context of health insurance, a handful of
papers address the question of whether individuals respond
at all to the nonlinearities in their budget set and which sin-
gle price may best approximate the nonlinear schedule to
which individuals respond. This is the focus of Liebman and
Zeckhauser (2004), Feldman and Katuscak (2006), and Saez
(2010) in the context of the response of labor supply to the
progressive income tax schedule, and of Borenstein (2009)
and Ito (2014) in the context of residential electricity utiliza-
tion. In most of these other contexts, as well as in our own
previous work on moral hazard in health insurance (Einav et
al., 2013), the analysis of demand in the presence of a nonlin-
ear pricing schedule is static. This is partly because in most
nonhealth contexts, information about intermediate utiliza-
tion levels (within the billing or tax cycle) is not easy to obtain
(for both consumers and researchers) and partly because
dynamic modeling often introduces unnecessary complica-
tions in the analysis. In this sense, our current study, using
the precise timing of medical utilization within the contract
year, is virtually unique within this literature in its explicit
focus on the dynamic aspect of medical utilization.3
2 Nonlinear pricing schedules are not unique to health insurance. Indeed,
a large literature, going back at least to Hausman (1985), develops methods
that address the difficulties that arise in modeling selection and utilization
under nonlinear budget sets, and applies these methods to other settings in
which similar nonlinearities are common, such as labor supply (Burtless &
Hausman, 1978; Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999; Chetty et al., 2011), electricity
utilization (Reiss & White, 2005), and cellular phones (Grubb & Osborne,
2015; Yao et al., 2012).
3 One exception in this regard is Keeler and Rolph (1988), who, like us,
test for dynamic incentives in health insurance contracts (but use a different
empirical strategy and reach a different conclusion). More recent exceptions
are Nevo, Turner, and Williams (2013), who analyze the effect of nonlinear
pricing schedules in the context of residential broadband use, and our own
work in the context of Medicare Part D (Einav, Finkelstein, & Schrimpf,
2015).
The focus on dynamic incentives relates more generally to
empirical tests of forward-looking behavior, which plays a
key role in many economic problems. From this perspective,
a closely related work to ours is Chevalier and Goolsbee’s
(2009) investigation of whether durable goods consumers
are forward looking in their demand for college textbooks
(they find that they are). Despite the obvious difference in
context, their empirical strategy is similar to ours. They use
the fact that static, spot incentives remain roughly constant
(as the pricing of textbook editions do not change much until
the arrival of new editions), while dynamic incentives (the
expected time until a new edition is released) change. A
slightly cleaner aspect of our setting is that the constant spot
prices and varying dynamic incentives are explicitly stipu-
lated in the coverage contract rather than empirical facts that
need to be estimated from data.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II
describes our research design and our data from the employer-
provided health insurance context. Section III presents our
main results. Section IV presents complementary analysis
and evidence in a related context using data from Medicare
Part D. The final section discusses some of the implications
of our findings for empirical work on moral hazard in health
insurance.
II. Approach and Data
A. Basic Approach
We test the null hypothesis that individuals’ health care
utilization decisions do not respond to dynamic incentives
created by nonlinear health insurance contracts. In other
words, we test whether their decisions can be approximated
by a myopic assumption according to which they respond
only to the spot price associated with a given health care
purchase.
An ideal experiment would randomly assign individuals to
settings in which the spot price is held fixed, while dynamic
incentives vary, and examine initial health care decisions.
If health care utilization decisions are well approximated by
assuming that individuals respond only to the spot price, (ini-
tial) health care decisions would not change across settings.
We focus throughout on initial health care decisions because
variation in dynamic incentives will, by design, vary the
out-of-pocket price associated with subsequent “noninitial”
health care spending.
Our novel observation is that the institutional features of
many health insurance contracts in the United States come
close to approximating such an ideal experiment. Specifi-
cally, we use the fact that unlike other lines of insurance, such
as auto insurance or home insurance, the annual coverage
period of employer-provided health insurance is not cus-
tomized to individual people and thus resets for all insurees
on the same date (typically on January 1). This presum-
ably reflects the need for market-wide synchronization to
accommodate open enrollment periods, bidding by insurers,
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and other related activities. (Presumably for similar reasons,
the same institutional feature applies to Medicare Part D
prescription drug plans. We discuss this in more detail below.)
As a result, employees’ annual health insurance coverage
begins (and ends, unless it is terminated due to job separa-
tion) on the same date for almost all individuals. Although all
employees can choose to join a new plan for the subsequent
year during the open enrollment period (typically in October
or November), there are only two reasons employees can join
a plan in the middle of the year: they are new hires or have a
qualifying event that allows them to change plans in the mid-
dle of the year.4 In order to transition new employees (and
occasionally existing employees who have a qualifying event)
into the regular cycle, the common practice is to let employees
choose from the regular menu of coverage options, to prorate
linearly the annual premium associated with their choices, but
to hold (at its annual level) the deductible amount constant.
As a result, individuals who are hired at different points in
the year, but are covered by the same (deductible) plan, face
the same spot price (of one) but different dynamic incentives;
all else equal, the probability that individuals would hit the
(uniform) deductible is higher for longer coverage periods.
Thus, as long as employees join the company at different
times for reasons that are exogenous to their medical uti-
lization behavior, variation in hire date (or in the timing of
qualifying events) generates quasi-experimental variation in
the dynamic incentives individuals face.
To illustrate, consider two identical employees who select
a plan with a $1,200 (annual) deductible and full coverage
for every additional spending. The first individual is hired
by the company in January and the second in October. The
employee who is hired in January faces a regular, annual
coverage, while the one who joins in October has only a
three-month coverage horizon, after which coverage resets
(on January 1 of the subsequent calendar year). The January
joiner is therefore more likely to hit his deductible by the
time the coverage resets. Therefore, in expectation, his end-
of-year price is lower, although—crucially—just after they
get hired, both January and October joiners have yet to hit
their deductible, so their spot price is (initially) the same.
If the employees respond to dynamic incentives, the January
joiner has a greater incentive to utilize medical care on joining
the plan; this would not be the case if the employees respond
only to the spot price of care. Therefore, differences in (initial)
spending cannot be attributed to differences in spot prices and
must reflect dynamic considerations.
B. Data
With this strategy in mind, we obtained claim-level data
on employer-provided health insurance in the United States.
We limited our sample to firms that offered at least one PPO
plan with a deductible (which would generate variation in the
4 Qualifying events include marriage, divorce, birth or adoption of a child,
a spouse’s loss of employment, or death of a dependent.
dynamic incentives based on the employee’s join month, as
described in the previous section) and at least one PPO plan
with no deductible. The relationship between initial utiliza-
tion and join month in the no-deductible plan is used to try
to control for other potential confounding patterns in initial
medical utilization by join month (such as seasonal flu); in
a typical no-deductible plan, the expected end-of-year price
is roughly constant by join month, so, absent confounding
effects that vary by join month, there are few dynamic incen-
tives and the initial medical utilization of employees covered
by a no-deductible plan should not systematically vary with
join month.
The data come from two sources. The first is Alcoa, Inc., a
large multinational producer of aluminum and related prod-
ucts. We have four years of data (2004–2007) on the health
insurance options, choices, and medical insurance claims of
its employees (and any insured dependents) in the United
States. We study the two most common health insurance plans
at Alcoa; one with a deductible for in-network expenditure
of $250 for single coverage ($500 for family coverage) and
one with no deductible associated with in-network spending.
While Alcoa employed (and the data cover) about 45,000
U.S.-based individuals every year, the key variation we use
in this paper is driven by midyear plan enrollment by individ-
uals not previously insured by the firm, thus restricting our
analysis to only about 7,000 unique employees (over the four
years) who meet our sample criteria.5 Of the employees at
Alcoa who join a plan midyear and did not previously have
insurance at Alcoa that year, about 80% are new hires, and
the other 20% are employees who were at Alcoa but unin-
sured at the firm, had a qualifying event that allowed them to
change plans in the middle of the year, and chose to switch
to Alcoa-provided insurance.
The Alcoa data are almost ideal for our purposes, with the
important exception of sample size. To increase statistical
power, we examined the set of firms (and plans) available
through the NBER’s files of Medstat’s MarketScan database.
The data on plan choices and medical spending are virtually
identical in nature and structure to our Alcoa data (indeed,
Alcoa administers its health insurance claims via Medstat);
they include coverage and claim-level information from an
employer-provided health insurance context, provided by a
set of (anonymous) large employers.
We selected two firms that satisfied our basic criteria of
being relatively large and offering both deductible and no-
deductible options to their employees. Each firm has about
60,000 employees who join one of these plans in the middle
of the year over the approximately six years of our data. This
substantially larger sample size is a critical advantage over
the Alcoa data. The main disadvantages of these data are that
we cannot tell apart new hires from existing employees who
are new to the firm’s health coverage (presumably due to
5 We restrict our analysis to employees who are not insured at the firm
prior to joining a plan in the middle of the year because if individuals change
plans within the firm (due to a qualifying event), the deductible would not
reset.
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Table 1.—Summary Statistics
“Average”
Midyear New In-Network Deductible ($) Fraction Fraction Average Enrollment
Employer Plan Years Offered Enrolleesa Single Family Family Female Age Monthb
Alcoa A0 2004–2007 3,269 0 0 0.622 0.379 38.56 6.28
A1 2004–2007 3,542 250 500 0.408 0.254 35.68 6.42
Firm B B0 2001–2005 37,759 0 0 0.530 0.362 36.77 6.35
B1 2001–2005 9,553 150 300 0.382 0.341 36.87 6.29
Firm Cc C0 1999–2002, 2004–2005 27,968 0 0 0.348 0.623 36.40 7.35
C1 1999–2000 6,243 200 500 0.348 0.622 37.53 7.50
C2 2001–2002 8,055 250 625 0.323 0.606 38.66 7.56
C3 2004–2005 5,633 300 750 0.299 0.660 38.51 7.67
aThe sample includes employees who enroll in February through October.
bIn computing the average enrollee month, we number the join months from 2 (February) through 10 (October).
cWe omit 2003 from the analysis since the plan documentation regarding the deductible plan was incomplete in that year.
qualifying events that allow them to join a health insurance
plan in the middle of the year), and there is less demographic
information on the employees.
Because employers in MarketScan are anonymous (and
we essentially know nothing about them), we will refer
to these two additional employers as firm B and firm C.
We focus on two plans offered by firm B. We have five
years of data (2001–2005) for these plans, during which
firm B offered one plan with no in-network deductible and
one plan that had a $150 ($300) in-network single (family)
deductible. The data for firm C are similar, except that the
features of the deductible plan have changed slightly over
time. We have seven years of data for firm C (1999–2005),
during which the firm continuously offered a no-deductible
plan (in-network) alongside a plan with a deductible. The
deductible amount increased over time, with a single (fam-
ily) in-network deductible of $200 ($500) during 1999 and
2000, $250 ($625) during 2001 and 2002, and $300 ($750)
during 2004 and 2005.
Table 1 summarizes the key features of the plans (and their
enrollment) that are covered by our final data set. In all three
firms, we limit our sample to employees who join a plan
between February and October and did not have insurance at
the firm immediately prior to this join date. We omit employ-
ees who join in January for reasons related to the way the data
are organized that make it difficult to tell apart new hires who
join the firm in January from existing employees. We omit
employees who join in November or December because, as
we discuss in more detail below, we use data from the first
three months after enrollment to construct our measures of
“initial” medical utilization.6 Table 1 also summarizes, by
plan, the limited demographic information we observe on
each covered employee: the type of coverage they chose (fam-
ily or single) and the employee’s gender, age, and enrollment
month.7
6 In practice we observe the join month rather than the join date. Thus,
throughout the paper, when we speak of the “first three months” after
enrollment, more precisely we are using the first two to three months after
enrollment. As long as the join day within the month is similar across
months, the average time horizon should also be similar by join month.
7 In each firm we lose roughly 15% to 30% of new plan joiners because
of some combination of missing information about the employee’s plan,
missing plan details, or missing claims data (because the plan is an HMO
or a partially or fully capitated POS plan).
C. Measuring Dynamic Incentives
Table 2 describes the key variation we use in our empirical
analysis. We use the expected end-of-year price to summarize
the dynamic incentive and report it as a function of the time
within the year an employee joined the plan.8 Specifically,
we define the expected end-of-year price, or future price, p f ,
as
p fjm = 1 − Pr(hitjm), (1)
where Pr(hitjm) is the probability an employee who joins plan
j in month m will hit (i.e., spend more than) the in-network
deductible by the end of the year. We calculate Pr(hit) as the
fraction of employees in a given plan and join month who
have spent more than the in-network deductible by the end of
the year.9 For example, consider a plan with a $500 deductible
and full coverage for any medical expenditures beyond the
deductible. If 80% of the employees who joined the plan in
February have hit the deductible by the end of the year, the
expected end-of-year price would be 0.8×0+0.2×1 = 0.2.
If only 40% of the employees who joined the plan in August
have hit the deductible by the end of the year, their expected
end-of-year price would be 0.4×0+0.6×1 = 0.6. Thus, the
future price is the average (out-of-pocket) end-of-year price
of an extra dollar of in-network spending. It is a function of
one’s plan j, join month m, and the annual spending of all the
employees in one’s plan and join month.10
Table 2 summarizes the average future price for each plan
based on the quarter of the year in which one joins the plan.
For plans with no deductible (A0, B0, and C0), the future price
is mechanically 0 (since everyone hits the zero deductible),
regardless of the join month. For deductible plans, however,
8 In this and all subsequent analyses, we pool the three different deductible
plans in firm C that were offered at different times over our sample period.
9 We calculate Pr(hit) separately for employees with individual and family
coverage (since both the deductible amount and spending patterns vary
with the coverage tier), and therefore in all of our analyses, p f varies with
coverage tier. However, for conciseness, in the tables we pool coverage tiers
and report the (weighted) average across coverage tiers within each plan.
10 To the extent that individuals have private information about their
future health spending, and thus about their expected end-of-year price,
our “average” measure will introduce measurement error and thus bias us
against finding a response to dynamic incentives.
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Table 2.—Variation in Expected End-of-Year Price
Deductible
(Single/Family) Expected End-of-Year Price
a
Employer Plan (N = enrollees) February–Aprilb May–Julyb August–Octoberb
Alcoa A0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
(N = 3,269) (N = 1,007) (N = 981) (N = 1,281)
A1 250/500 0.512 0.603 0.775
(N = 3,542) (N = 975) (N = 1,114) (N = 1,453)
Firm B B0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
(N = 37,759) (N = 8,863) (N = 15,102) (N = 13,794)
B1 150/300 0.529 0.630 0.806
(N = 9,553) (N = 2,165) (N = 4,175) (N = 3,213)
Firm C C0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
(N = 27,968) (N = 6,504) (N = 6,158) (N = 15,306)
C1–C3c 200–300/500–750 0.543 0.633 0.811
(N = 19,931) (N = 4,001) (N = 4,143) (N = 11,787)
aExpected end-of-year price is equal to the fraction of individuals who do not hit the deductible by the end of the calendar year (and therefore face a marginal price of 1). It is computed based on the plan’s deductible
level(s), the join month, and the annual spending of all the employees who joined that plan in that month. We compute it separately for family and single coverage within a plan and report the enrollment-weighted
average.
bMonth individuals joined plan.
cIn firm C, we pool the three deductible plans (C1, C2, and C3) that are offered in different years.
the future price varies with the join month. Only a small frac-
tion of the individuals who join plans late in the year (August
through October) hit their deductible, so their future price
is around 0.8 in all firms. In contrast, many more employ-
ees who join a deductible plan early in the year (February to
April) hit their deductible, so for such employees, the future
price is just over 0.5. Thus, early joiners who select plans
with a deductible face an average end-of-year price that is
about 30 percentage points lower than the end-of-year price
faced by late joiners. Yet initially (just after they join), both
types of employees have yet to hit their deductible, so they
all face a spot price of one. Differences in initial spending
between the groups therefore plausibly reflect their dynamic
response to the future price. This baseline definition of the
future price—the fraction of employees who join a given plan
in a given month whose spending does not exceed the in-
network deductible by the end of the calendar year—will be
used as the key right-hand variable in much of our subsequent
empirical work.
Our baseline measure of the future price abstracts from
several additional characteristics of the plans, which are
summarized in appendix table A1. First, it ignores any coin-
surance features of the plans. Plans A0, A1, and C1 to C3
all have a 10% coinsurance rate, while plans B0 and C0 have
a 0 coinsurance rate. The coinsurance rate for plan B1 is
unknown (to us). Second, we use only the in-network plan
features and assume that all spending occurs in network.
In practice, each plan (including the no-deductible plan)
has deductibles and higher consumer coinsurance rates for
medical spending that occurs out of network.
There are two consequences of these abstractions, both of
which bias any estimated impact of the future price on behav-
ior toward 0. First, abstracting from these features introduces
measurement error into the future price. Second, our anal-
ysis assumes that for the no-deductible plans, there is no
variation in the future price for employees who join in dif-
ferent months (i.e., the spot price and the future price are
always the same). In practice, both a positive in-network
coinsurance rate (prior to the stop-loss) and the existence
of out-of-network deductibles in all of the no-deductible (in-
network) plans mean that the future price also increases with
the join month for employees in the no-deductible plans.
III. Main Results
A. Patterns of Initial Utilization by Join Month
We proxy for initial medical utilization with two measures.
In both cases, the measures of utilization encompass the uti-
lization of the employee and any covered dependents. Our
main measure of initial utilization is an indicator for whether
the individual had any claim over some initial duration (“any
initial claim”). We use three months as our initial duration
measure; results are qualitatively similar for shorter dura-
tions. Overall, about 58% of the sample has a claim within
the first three months. As an additional measure, we also look
at a measure of total spending (in dollars) over the initial three
months. Average three-month spending in our sample is about
$600.
Figure 1 reports, for each firm separately, the pattern of
initial medical utilization by join month for the deductible
plan and the no-deductible plan. The panels on the left report
the results for whether there is a claim in the first three
months; the right panels report results for initial three-month
spending. These statistics already indicate what appears to
be a response to dynamic incentives. For the deductible
plan, the probability of an initial claim and initial medical
spending both generally tend to fall with join month (and
expected end-of-year price), while there is generally no sys-
tematic relationship between join month and initial medical
utilization in the corresponding no-deductible plan. This is
exactly the qualitative pattern one would expect if individuals
respond to dynamic incentives.
We operationalize this analysis a little more formally by
regressing measures of initial utilization on join month. A unit
of observation is an employee e who joins health insurance
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Table 3.—Relationship between Initial Medical Utilization and Join Month
Deductible Any Initial Claim
a Log Initial Spendingb
(Single/Family) Difference DD Difference DD
Employer Plan (N = enrollees) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Alcoa A0 0 −0.001 −0.003
(N = 3,269) (0.002) (0.023)
A1 250/500 −0.002 −0.001 −0.015 −0.012
(N = 3,542) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.027)
Firm B B0 0 −0.006 −0.015
(N = 37,759) (0.001) (0.007)
B1 150/300 −0.016 −0.010 −0.091 −0.075
(N = 9,553) (0.004) (0.003) (0.026) (0.025)
Firm C C0 0 −0.0004 −0.004
(N = 27,968) (0.002) (0.013)
C1–C3 200–300/500–750 −0.0043 −0.0039 −0.027 −0.022
(N = 19,931) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.012) (0.010)
The table reports coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regressing a measure of initial medical care utilization (defined in the top row) on join month (which ranges from 2, for February, to 10, for
October). Columns 1 and 3 report the coefficient on join month separately for each plan, based on estimating equation (2). The regressions also include an indicator variable for coverage tier (single versus family).
Columns 2 and 4 report the difference-in-differences (DD) coefficient on the interaction of join month and having a deductible plan, separately for each firm, based on estimating equation (3). The regressions also
include plan by coverage tier fixed effects and join month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on join month by coverage tier.
aThe dependent variable is an indicator for at least one claim made by the employee or any covered family members within the first three months in the plan.
bThe dependent variable is log(s + 1), where s is the total medical spending of the employee and any covered family members in their first three months in the plan.
plan j during calendar month m. As mentioned, we limit atten-
tion to employees who join new plans between February and
October, so m ∈ {2, . . . , 10}. As a result, all of our com-
parisons of patterns of initial utilization by join month, both
within and across plans, are among a set of employees who
are new to their plan.
The simplest way by which we can implement our strat-
egy is to look within a given health plan that has a positive
deductible and regress a measure of initial medical utilization
ye on the join month me and possibly a set of controls xe, so
that
ye = βjme + x′eγ + ue. (2)
Absent any confounding influences of join month on ye, we
would expect an estimate of βj = 0 for deductible plans if
individuals respond only to the spot price of care and βj <
0 if individuals do not. We include an additional covariate
for whether the employee has family (as opposed to single)
coverage to account for the fact that the deductible varies
within a plan by coverage tier (see table 1) and that there
naturally exist large differences in average medical utilization
in family versus single coverage plans.
We analyze two different dependent variables. “Any ini-
tial claim” is a binary variable for whether the insured had
any claim in the first three months. “Log initial spending”
is defined as log(s + 1), where s is total medical spending
(in dollars) by the insured during his first three months in
the plan. Given that medical utilization is highly skewed, the
log transformation helps in improving precision and reduc-
ing the effect of outliers.11 Columns 1 and 3 of table 3 report
results from estimating equation (2) on these two dependent
11 While conceptually a concave transformation is therefore useful, we
have no theoretical guidance as to the “right” functional form. Any trans-
formation therefore (including the one we choose) is ad hoc, and we simply
choose one that is convenient and easy to implement. We note, however, that
Box-Cox analysis of the s + 1 variable suggests that a log transformation
is appropriate.
variables, separately for each plan. The key right-hand-side
variable is the join month, enumerated from 2 (February)
to 10 (October). In plans that have a deductible (A1, B1,
and C1–C3), dynamic considerations would imply a neg-
ative relationship between join month and initial medical
utilization. The results show exactly this qualitative pattern.
B. Patterns of Initial Utilization by Join Month for
Deductible verse No-Deductible Plans
If seasonality in medical utilization is an important factor,
it could confound the interpretation of the estimated relation-
ship we have just discussed. For example, if claim propensity
in the spring is greater than claim propensity in the summer
due to, say, seasonal flu, then we may incorrectly attribute
the decline in spot utilization for late joiners as a response to
dynamic incentives. To address such concerns about possible
confounding differences across employees who join plans
at different months of the year, we use as a control group
employees within the same firm who join the health insurance
plan with no deductible in different months. As discussed
earlier, such employees are in a plan in which the spot price
and future price are roughly the same, so that changes in
their initial utilization over the year (or lack thereof) provide
a way to measure and control for factors that influence ini-
tial utilization by join month that are unrelated to dynamic
incentives.
Columns 1 and 3 of table 3, discussed earlier, also show
the plan-level analysis of the relationship between initial
medical utilization and join month for the no-deductible
plans (A0, B0, and C0).12 The coefficient on join month for
the no-deductible plans tends to be much smaller than the
12 The table reports average effects across the year. Figure 1 provided
the graphical analog. Table 2 shows that the number of observations
(new employees) is not uniform over the year; thus the regression results,
especially in the context of Firm C, are affected more strongly by the
late-in-the-year utilization patterns.
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coefficient for the deductible plan in the same firm (and is
often statistically indistinguishable from 0). This suggests
that the difference-in-difference estimates of the pattern of
spending by join month in deductible plans relative to the
analogous pattern in no-deductible plans will look very sim-
ilar to the patterns in the deductible plans. Indeed, this is
what we find, as reported in columns 2 and 4 of table 3,
which report this difference-in-difference analysis in which
the no-deductible plan (within the same firm) is used to
control for the seasonal pattern of initial utilization by join
month in the “absence” of dynamic incentives. Specifically,
the difference-in-differences specification is
ye = β′meDj + μj + τm + x′eγ′ + υe, (3)
where μj are plan fixed effects, τm are join-month fixed
effects, and Dj is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when j
is a deductible plan. The plan fixed effects (the μj’s) include
separate fixed effects for each plan by coverage tier (fam-
ily or single) since the coverage tier affects the deductible
amount (see table 1). Again, our coefficient of interest is β′,
where β′ = 0 would be consistent with the lack of response
to dynamic incentives, while β′ < 0 is consistent with health
care utilization decisions responding to dynamic incentives.
Since we are now pooling results across plans (deductible and
no-deductible plans), the parameter of interest β′ no longer
has a j subscript.
The results in table 3 indicate that except at Alcoa,
where we have much smaller sample sizes, the difference-
in-difference estimates for each firm provide statistically
significant evidence of a response to dynamic incentives. For
example, in firm B, we find that enrollment a month later in
a plan with a ($150 or $300) deductible relative to enroll-
ment a month later in a plan with no deductible is associated
with a 1 percentage point decline in the probability of any
claim in the first three months and an 8% decline in medical
expenditure over the same period. In firm C, these numbers
are somewhat lower: a 0.4 percentage point decline and a 2%
decline, respectively.
Of course, employees who self-select into a no-deductible
plan are likely to be sicker and to use medical care more fre-
quently than employees who select plans with a deductible
(due to both selection and moral hazard effects). Indeed, table
1 shows that there are, not surprisingly, some observable dif-
ferences between employees within a firm who choose the
no-deductible option instead of the deductible option. Our
key identifying assumption is that while initial medical uti-
lization may differ on average between employees who join
deductible plans and those who join no-deductible plans,
the within-year pattern of initial utilization by join month
does not vary based on whether the employee joined the
deductible or no-deductible plan except for dynamic incen-
tives. In other words, we assume that any differences in initial
utilization between those who join the no-deductible plan and
the deductible plan within a firm can be controlled for by a sin-
gle (join-month invariant) dummy variable. We return to this
below, when we discuss possible threats to this identifying
assumption and attempt to examine its validity.
C. Testing the Relationship between Expected End-of-Year
Price and Initial Utilization
The above analyses suggest that individuals’ initial medi-
cal utilization responds to their contract duration, and does so
differentially by the nature of the contract. To more directly
investigate this relationship, as well as to enhance compara-
bility across firms, we map the contract duration of a given
contract into a measure of the expected end-of-year price p f
defined earlier (recall equation [1] for a definition, and table
2 for summary statistics).13 We then analyze a variant of
the difference-in-difference analysis (equation [3]) in which
we replace the deductible interacted with the join month vari-
able (meDj) with the expected end-of-year price variable. The
estimating equation is thus modified to
ye =˜β′p fjm + μ˜j + τ˜m + x′eγ˜′ + υ˜e, (4)
where (as before) μ˜j are plan (by coverage tier) fixed effects
and τ˜m are join-month fixed effects. This transformation also
aids in addressing the likely nonlinear effect of join month
on both expected end-of-year price and expected utilization.
Table 2 indicates that, indeed, our measure of the end-of-year
price varies nonlinearly over time.
The future price variable is constructed based on the
observed spending patterns of people who join a specific plan
(and coverage tier) in a specific month, while our dependent
variable is a function of that spending for an individual in that
plan and enrollment month. This raises three related issues
for interpreting the coefficient on the future price in equation
(4) as the causal effect of the future price on initial medi-
cal utilization. The first issue is the mechanical relationship
between the future price (our key right-hand-side variable)
and initial health care utilization (the dependent variable):
higher initial spending of individuals who enroll in a given
plan in a given month would make them more likely to hit the
deductible by the end of the year, and thus mechanically make
our measure of future price lower. This will bias our estimate
of the impact of the future price on utilization away from 0. A
second issue is a standard reflection bias concern. The future
price is calculated based on the total spending of the set of
people who enroll in a given plan in a given month, and the
dependent variable is the initial spending of a given person
who enrolled in the plan in that month. This problem is more
acute the smaller is the sample size of people enrolling in a
given plan in a given month (and thus the larger the contribu-
tion of the individual to the plan-month mean total spending).
A final issue is the potential for common shocks. If there is
13 If individuals are risk neutral, this is the only moment of the dynamic
incentives that should matter for their utilization decisions. In practice,
individuals may not be risk neutral and other moments of the end-of-year
price may affect initial utilization. Limiting our analysis to the impact of
the expected end-of-year price can therefore bias us against rejecting the
null of no response to dynamic incentives.
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a shock to health or spending that is specific to individuals
enrolling in a specific plan in a specific month (e.g., the flu
hits particularly virulently those who enroll in a particular
plan in a different month), this introduces an omitted vari-
able that is driving both the calculated future price and initial
drug use.
To address all three of these concerns, we estimate an
instrumental variable version of equation (4) in which we
instrument for the future price with a simulated future price.
In principle, the join month interacted with the deductible
would be a valid instrument (and in this sense table 3 can be
seen as presenting a set of “reduced form” results). Our simu-
lated future price is simply a nonlinear function of join month
and deductible. Like the future price, the simulated future
price is computed based on the characteristics of the plan (by
coverage tier) chosen and the month joined. However, unlike
the future price, which is calculated based on the spending
of people who joined that plan (by coverage tier) that month,
the simulated future price is calculated based on the spending
of all employees in that firm and coverage tier in our sam-
ple who joined either the deductible or no-deductible plan,
regardless of join month. Specifically, for every employee in
our sample in a given firm and coverage tier (regardless of
plan and join month), we compute their monthly spending
for all months that we observe them during the year that they
join the plan, creating a common monthly spending pool. We
then simulate the future price faced by an employee in a par-
ticular plan and join month by drawing (with replacement)
110,000 draws of monthly spending from this common pool,
for every month for which we need a monthly spending mea-
sure.14 For each simulation we then compute the expected
end-of-year price based on the draws. By using a common
sample of employee spending that does not vary with plan
or join month, the instrument is “purged” of any potential
variation in initial medical utilization that is correlated with
plan and join month, in very much the same spirit as Currie
and Gruber’s (1996) simulated Medicaid eligibility instru-
ment. An additional attraction of this IV strategy is that it
helps correct for any measurement error in our calculated
future price (which would bias the coefficient toward 0). On
net, therefore, the OLS estimate may be biased upward or
downward relative to the IV estimate.
The first three rows of table 4 report, separately for each
firm, the results of estimating equation (4) by OLS and IV. As
would be expected, the first stage is very strong. The results
consistently show a negative relationship between the future
price and our measures of initial medical use. The results are
statistically insignificant for Alcoa, but almost always statis-
tically significant for firms B and C (where the sample sizes
are much bigger). The IV estimates tend to be smaller than
the OLS estimates, suggesting that on net, the OLS estimates
14 For the first month, we draw from the pool of first-month spending
(since people may join the plan in the middle of the month, the first month’s
spending has a different distribution from other months), whereas for all
other months in the plan that year, we draw from the pool (across families
and months) of non-first-month spending.
Table 4.—Relationship between Initial Medical Utilization and
Expected End-of-Year Price
Any Initial Claima Log Initial Spendingb
OLS IV OLS IV
Sample N (1) (2) (3) (4)
Alcoa 6,811 −0.09 −0.03 −0.76 −0.33
(0.07) (0.09) (0.51) (0.63)
Firm B 47,312 −0.22 −0.22 −1.73 −1.70
(0.07) (0.06) (0.54) (0.51)
Firm C 47,899 −0.10 −0.09 −0.81 −0.37
(0.04) (0.05) (0.37) (0.24)
Pooled 102,022 −0.14 −0.13 −1.08 −0.78
(0.04) (0.04) (0.29) (0.27)
The table reports coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regressing a measure of initial
medical care utilization (defined in the top row) on the expected end-of-year price, computed for each plan
(by coverage tier) and join month. Columns 1 and 3 report the OLS coefficient on expected end-of-year
price (p f ) from estimating equation (4); these regressions include plan by coverage tier fixed effects and
join month fixed effects. In the bottom row, we estimate this by pooling the data from all firms and plans,
where, in addition to the plan-by-coverage tier and join month fixed effects, these regressions now also
include firm-by-join-month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on join month by coverage tier by
firm. Columns 2 and 4 report IV estimates of the same regressions, where we use a simulated end-of-year
price as an instrument for the expected end-of-year price (see the text for details). For the pooled regression
(bottom row), the coefficient on the instrument in the first stage is 0.56 (standard error 0.024); the F-statistic
on the instrument is 524. For the individual firm regressions, the coefficient on the instrument in the first
stage ranges between 0.49 and 0.71, is always statistically significant, and has an F-statistic above 400.
aThe dependent variable is an indicator for at least one claim made by the employee or any covered
family members within the first three months in the plan.
bThe dependent variable is log(s + 1) where s is the total medical spending of the employee and any
covered family members in their first three months in the plan.
are upward biased due to common shocks or endogenous
spending discussed above.
Thus far, all of the analysis has been of single plans or
pairs of plans within a firm. The use of future price (rather
than join month) also allows us to more sensibly pool results
across firms and summarize them with a single number, since
the relationship between join month and future price will
vary with both the level of the deductible and the employee
population. In pooling the data, however, we continue to rely
on only within-firm variation. That is, we estimate
ye =˜β
′
pfjm +˜μj +˜τmf + x′e˜γ′ +˜υe, (5)
where ˜τmf denotes a full set of join month by firm fixed
effects. The bottom row of table 4 reports the results from this
regression. Once again we report both OLS and IV results.
The effect of future price in this pooled regression is sta-
tistically significant for both dependent variables. The IV
estimates indicate that a 10 cent increase in the future out-of-
pocket price (for every dollar of total health care spending) is
associated with a 1.3 percentage point (about 2.2%) decline in
the probability of an initial medical claim and a 7.8% decline
in initial medical spending. Given an average expected end-
of-year price of about 70 cents (for every dollar of medical
spending) for people in our sample who choose the deductible
plan, the 2.2% decline in the probability of an initial claim
suggests an elasticity of initial claiming with respect to the
future price of about −0.16. The 7.8% decline in initial medi-
cal spending suggests an elasticity of initial medical spending
with respect to the future price of −0.56.15
15 We note that the IV estimate of the impact of the future price on the first
three months’ spending could be biased upward since the spot price may
vary across individuals over the first three months; 17% of individuals in
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We investigated the margin on which the individual’s
response to the future price occurs. About three-quarters of
medical expenditures in our data represent outpatient spend-
ing; per episode, inpatient care is more expensive and perhaps
less discretionary than outpatient care. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly therefore, we find clear evidence of a response of
outpatient spending to the future price, but we are unable
to reject the null of no response of inpatient spending to the
future price (appendix table A2 contains the results).
We also explored the robustness of our results to some
of our modeling choices. The working paper version of this
paper shows the robustness of our results to alternative func-
tional forms for the dependent variables (Aron-Dine et al.,
2012). In appendix table A3, we further show the robustness
of our results to alternative choices of covariates regarding
the firm and coverage tier fixed effects.
D. Assessing the Identifying Assumption
The key identifying assumption that allows us to interpret
the results as a rejection of the null hypothesis that health
care utilization responds only to the spot price of care is that
there are no confounding differences in initial medical uti-
lization among employees by their plan and join month. In
other words, any differential patterns of initial medical uti-
lization that we observe across plans by join month are caused
by differences in expected end-of-year price. This identifying
assumption might not be correct if for some reason individu-
als who join a particular plan in different months vary in their
underlying propensity to use medical care.
In particular, one might be concerned that the same
response to dynamic incentives that may lead to differen-
tial medical care utilization might also lead to differential
selection into a deductible compared to a no-deductible plan
on the basis of join month. However, if there are additional
choice or preference parameters governing insurance plan
selection that do not directly determine medical utilization,
there may be no reason to expect such selection, even in the
context of dynamically optimizing individuals. For example,
if individuals anticipate the apparently large switching costs
associated with subsequent reoptimization of plan choice (as
in Handel, 2013), they might make their initial, midyear plan
choice based on their subsequent optimal open enrollment
deductible plans spend past the deductible in the first three months. This is
not a problem when the dependent variable is whether the individual has a
first claim (since the spot price is the same for all individuals within a plan
at the time of first claim). In practice, moreover, any upward bias is likely
unimportant quantitatively. We estimate a virtually identical response to the
future price when the dependent variable is based on two-month (instead
of three-month) spending, even though the fraction hitting the deductible
within the initial utilization period (and therefore the likely magnitude of
the bias) drops by almost half. Moreover, there is no noticeable trend in the
likelihood of hitting the deductible within the first three months by the join
month. Hitting the deductible within a short time after enrollment therefore
appears to be primarily determined by large and possibly nondiscretionary
health shocks rather than an endogenous spending response to the future
price.
selection for a complete year. In such a case, we would not
expect differential selection into plans by join month.
Ultimately, whether there is quantitatively important dif-
ferential selection and its nature is an empirical question. The
summary statistics in table 2 present some suggestive evi-
dence that individuals may be (slightly) more likely to select
the deductible plan relative to the no-deductible plan later in
the year.16 Quantitatively, however, the effect is trivial; joining
a month later is associated with only a 0.3 percentage point
increase in the probability of choosing the deductible plan,
or 0.9%.17 Consistent with a lack of strategic plan selection
based on join month, we did not find differential selection in
employees’ plan choices in their second year at the firm out of
the deductible plan relative to the no-deductible plan by join
month.18 Nor did we find systematic differences in observable
characteristics (i.e., age and gender) of individuals joining a
deductible versus no-deductible plan by join month (shown
in appendix table A4). Relatedly, row 2 of table 5 shows that
our results are not sensitive to adding controls for the observ-
able demographic characteristics of the employees: employee
age, gender, and join year (see table 1).19
As another potential way to investigate the validity of the
identifying assumption, we implement an imperfect placebo
test by reestimating our baseline specification, equation (5),
with the dependent variable as the “initial” medical utilization
in the second year the employee is in the plan. In other words,
we continue to define “initial medical utilization” relative to
the join month (so that the calendar month in which we mea-
sure initial medical utilization varies in the same way as in
our baseline specification across employees by join month),
but we now measure it in the second year the employee is
in the plan. For example, for employees who joined the plan
in July 2004, we look at their medical spending from July
through September 2005. In principle, when employees are in
the plan for a full year, there should be no effect of join month
(of the previous year) on their expected end-of-year price,
and therefore no difference in initial utilization by join month
across the plans. In practice, the test suffers from the problem
that the amount of medical care consumed in the join year
could influence (either positively or negatively) the amount
consumed in the second year, either because of intertemporal
substitution (which could generate negative serial correla-
tion) or because medical care creates demand for further care
(e.g., follow-up visits or further tests), which could generate
positive serial correlation.
16 Over the three join quarters shown in table 2, the share joining the
deductible plan varies in Alcoa from 0.49 to 0.53 to 0.53, in firm B from
0.20 to 0.22 to 0.19, and in firm C from 0.38 to 0.40 to 0.44.
17 We regressed an indicator variable for whether the employee chose a
deductible plan on the employee’s join month (enumerated, as before, from
2 to 10), together with a dummy variable for coverage tier and firm fixed
effects to parallel our main specification. The coefficient on join month is
0.0034 (SE 0.0018).
18 On average, only about 4% of employees change their plan in the second
year, which is consistent with low rates of switching found in other work
(Handel, 2013).
19 In keeping with the “within-firm” spirit of the entire analysis, we interact
each of these variables with the firm fixed effects.
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Table 5.—Robustness and Speciﬁcation Checks
Any Initial Claim Initial Spending
Coefficient on p f SE Coefficient on p f SE
Specification N (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Baseline 102,022 −0.126 (0.039) −0.78 (0.27)
2 Control for demographics 102,014 −0.097 (0.034) −0.66 (0.24)
3 Only those who remain 64,398 −0.131 (0.043) −0.96 (0.33)
for 2nd year
4 Dependent Variable measured 64,398 0.003 (0.037) 0.03 (0.28)
in 2nd year
5 Dependent Variable measured 64,398 −0.032 (0.035) −0.33 (0.25)
January–March of 2nd year
The table reports results from alternative analyses of the relationship between initial medical utilization and expected end-of-year price. We report the coefficient on expected end-of-year price (p f ) from estimating
equation (4) by IV; we use a simulated end-of-year price as an instrument for the expected end-of-year price (see text for more details). Row 1 shows the baseline results reported in the bottom row of table 4. Alternative
rows report single deviations from this baseline as explained below. In row 2, we add controls for age, gender, and start year (as well as interactions of each of those with the firm fixed effects) to the baseline specification.
In row 3, we estimate the baseline specification on a smaller sample of employees who remain in the firm for the entire subsequent year. In row 4, we estimate the baseline specification on this same sample, but defining
the dependent variable based on utilization in the same three months of the subsequent year (i.e., their first full year in the firm). And in row 5, we estimate the baseline specification on this same sample but now define
the dependent variable based on utilization in January to March of the first full year in the firm.
Row 3 of table 5 shows the baseline results limited to
the approximately 60% of the employees who remain at the
firm for the entire second year. We continue to find a sta-
tistically significant negative relationship between the future
price and initial medical use in this smaller sample. For this
subsample of employees, row 4 shows that when we mea-
sure initial utilization in the same three months of the second
year, we find no statistically significant relationship between
the future price and this alternative dependent variable; the
point estimates are in fact positive and one to two orders of
magnitude smaller than our baseline estimates. We interpret
this as supportive of the identifying assumption.
Finally, in row 5 we investigate the extent to which the
decrease in utilization in response to a higher future price
represents intertemporal substitution of medical spending to
the next year. Such intertemporal substitution would not be a
threat to our empirical design—indeed, it might be viewed as
evidence of another form of response to dynamic incentives—
but it would affect the interpretation of our estimates and is
of interest in its own right. We therefore rerun our baseline
specification but now with the dependent variables measured
in January to March of the second year. The results indicate
that individuals who face a higher future price (and therefore
consume less medical care) also consume less medical care
in the beginning of the subsequent year, although the results
are not statistically significant and are substantially smaller
than our baseline estimates. This suggests that intertempo-
ral substitution, in the form of postponement of care to the
subsequent calendar year, is unlikely to be the main driver of
the estimated decrease in care associated with a higher future
price.
IV. Complementary Evidence from Medicare Part D
To further validate the main finding and the more general
applicability of the empirical strategy, we provide comple-
mentary evidence of the role of dynamic incentives among
elderly individuals enrolled in Medicare Part D prescription
drug plans.
Medicare provides medical insurance to the elderly and
disabled. Medicare Part D, which was introduced in 2006,
provides prescription drug coverage. Enrollees in Part D can
choose among different prescription drug plans, with differ-
ent plan features and premiums, offered by private insurers.
The key institutional feature that generates variation in the
contract length is similar to the one we have exploited so
far. Medicare Plan D provides annual coverage, which resets
every January.20 Most individuals become eligible for Part
D coverage in the beginning of the month that they turn 65
(CMS, 2011), so during their first year in Medicare, individ-
uals’ coverage duration varies primarily due to variation in
birth month.
Like employer-provided health insurance plans, prescrip-
tion drug insurance plans in Part D create highly nonlinear
budget sets, so that variation in the contract length in turn
creates variation in the future price. In the spirit of the prior
analysis, we can compare initial drug use for individuals who
face the same spot price but different future prices for a reason
that is plausibly unrelated to prescription drug use. Specif-
ically, individuals who newly enroll in a given Part D plan
when they turn 65 face the same initial spot price for drugs.
However, because the insurance contract resets at the end of
each calendar year, different individuals in the same Part D
plan face different future prices depending on which month
of the year they turn 65 and enroll in Part D. Furthermore, the
sign and magnitude of the relationship between the month in
which the individual joins the plan and the future price will
vary depending on the type of plan.
Indeed, a particularly attractive feature of the Part D plans
is that, unlike typical employer-provided health insurance
contracts, in some plans, the future price is increasing in
join month, while in others it is decreasing. For example,
in the government-defined standard benefit design for 2008,
the individual initially pays for all expenses out of pocket,
until she has spent $275, at which point she pays only 25%
20 As in the employer-provided context, Medicare Part D choices are made
during the open enrollment period in November and December of each year,
and unless a specific qualifying event occurs, individuals cannot switch
plans during the year.
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Figure 2.—Probability of Initial Claim and Expected End-of-Year Price
by Enrollment Month
The figure graphs the pattern of expected end-of-year price and of any initial drug claim by enrollment
month for individuals in Medicare Part D during their first year of eligibility (once they turn age 65). We
graph results separately for individuals in deductible and no-deductible plans. We calculate the expected
end-of-year price separately for each individual based on plan and birth month, using all other individuals
who enrolled in the same plan that month. The fraction with initial claim is measured as the share of
individuals (by plan type and enrollment month) who had at least one claim over the first three months.
The online appendix provides more details on the construction of variables used in this figure. N =
137,536 (N = 108,577 for no-deductible plans and N = 28,959 for deductible plans).
of subsequent drug expenditures until her total drug spend-
ing reaches $2,510. At this point the individual enters the
famed “doughnut hole,” or the gap, within which she must
once again pay for all expenses out of pocket, until total
drug expenditures reach $5,726, the amount at which cat-
astrophic coverage sets in and the marginal out-of-pocket
price of additional spending drops substantially, to about 7%.
In this plan, given the empirical distribution of drug spend-
ing, the end-of-year price is rising with enrollment month,
since a shorter contract length means less chance to spend
past the deductible into the lower-cost sharing arm. However,
many individuals buy plans with no deductible, and here the
expected end-of-year price tends to decline with join month
since a shorter contract length creates less time to spend into
the higher-cost sharing doughnut hole.
To operationalize the strategy, we use a 20% random sam-
ple of all Medicare Part D beneficiaries in 2007 through
2009. We observe the cost-sharing characteristics of each
beneficiary’s plan, as well as detailed claim-level informa-
tion on any prescription drugs purchased. We also observe
basic demographic information (including age, gender, and
eligibility for various programs tailored to low income indi-
viduals). Given the identification strategy, our analysis is
limited to 65-year-olds who enroll between February and
October. We make a number of other sample restrictions,
including limiting to individuals who are in stand-alone
prescription drug plans and are not dually eligible for Med-
icaid or other low-income subsidies. These restrictions are
described in more detail in the appendix. Our analysis sample
consists of about 138,000 beneficiaries.
Figure 2 summarizes the main empirical result graphically.
We show the pattern of expected end-of-year price and initial
drug use by enrollment month separately for beneficiaries
in two groups of plans: deductible and no-deductible plans.
The expected end-of-year price depends on the cost-sharing
features of the beneficiary’s plan, the number of months of the
contract, and the individual’s expected spending. We measure
initial drug use by whether the individual had a claim in the
first three months of coverage.
Once again, the patterns of initial use by enrollment month
present evidence against the null of no response to the
dynamic incentives. In deductible plans, where the future
price is increasing with enrollment month, initial utilization
is decreasing with enrollment month. By contrast, in the no-
deductible plan, where the future price is decreasing with
enrollment month, the probability of an initial claim does
appear to vary systematically with the enrollment month. A
difference-in-difference comparison of the pattern of initial
drug use by enrollment month for people in plans in which
the future price increases with enrollment month relative to
people in plans in which the future price decreases with
enrollment month thus suggests that initial use is decreas-
ing in the expected end-of-year price. The appendix provides
more detailed and formal analyses that follow the same struc-
ture as the main analysis in the employer-provided context.
We estimate a statistically significant elasticity of initial pre-
scription drug claims with respect to the future price. Our
estimated elasticity is about −0.25, which is qualitatively
similar to the −0.16 estimate for initial medical claims we
estimated in the main analysis.
V. Discussion
Our results show that individuals’ decisions regarding
medical utilization respond to the dynamic incentives associ-
ated with the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts.
This jointly indicates that individuals understand something
about the nonlinear pricing schedule they face and that they
take account of the future price in making current medi-
cal decisions. One clear implication of our results is that
assuming that the spot price associated with a given medical
treatment is the only relevant price may be problematic, and
that ignoring the dynamic incentives associated with nonlin-
ear contracts may miss an important component of the story
in many contexts. But then what? How should we take into
account the dynamic incentives in analyzing moral hazard
effects of health insurance? In this section we offer some
general discussion and guidance on the topic.
A. A Single Elasticity Estimate May Not Be Enough
A natural reaction to our findings might be that researchers
should estimate the response of health care utilization to the
future price. This is, however, unlikely to be a satisfactory
solution. First, defining the future price is itself a some-
what delicate task; it would require modeling individuals’
expectations about their health shocks over the coming year
and deciding what moments of the distribution of possible
end-of-year prices are relevant to the individual’s decisions.
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For the empirical work above, we defined the future price
as the expected end-of-year price, with expectations taken
over all individuals in the same plan and join month. This
imposed the (strong) assumptions that individuals have no
private information about their health shocks and that they are
risk neutral. In the context of our empirical exercise above,
which is focused on testing a null, if these assumptions are
invalid, they would generally bias us against rejecting the null
hypothesis that individuals do not respond to dynamic incen-
tives in their health care utilization decisions. However, for
further empirical work that attempts to quantify the moral
hazard response, trying to get such assumptions right, or
investigating sensitivity to them, becomes more important.
A second issue with estimating the response of health care
utilization to the future price is that so far, all we have done is
reject the null that individuals respond only to the spot price.
We have not established that individuals respond only to the
(correctly defined) future price. Individuals would respond
only to the future price if they fully understood the budget
set they face, they were completely forward looking, and
they were not liquidity constrained. To the extent that these
requirements are not fully met, individuals’ decisions regard-
ing health care utilization likely reflect responses to both the
spot prices and the (correctly defined) future price, and anal-
ysis of the price response should take both into account. That
is, a single elasticity estimate, regardless of how carefully
and credibly it is estimated, would be insufficient to inform
a counterfactual exercise
When individuals respond to both spot and future prices,
the researcher confronts some trade-offs in how to proceed
with analysis of moral hazard effects in health insurance.
One option is to write down and estimate a complete model
of primitives that govern how an individual’s medical care
utilization responds to the entire nonlinear budget set cre-
ated by the health insurance contract. This would require,
among other things, estimating the individual’s beliefs about
the arrival rate of medical shocks over the year, his discount
rate of future events, and his willingness to trade off health
and medical utilization against other consumption. In Einav
et al. (2015) we provide an example of this type of approach
to analyzing how individuals’ prescription drug expenditure
decisions would change in response to various changes in the
nonlinear budget set of Medicare Part D contracts. Of course,
writing down such a model of health care utilization involves
many assumptions.
An alternative, more reduced-form approach would be to
exploit identifying variation along a specific dimension of the
contract design, holding others fixed. This would allow the
researcher to produce estimates of the behavioral response
to changes in contract parameters for which there is credible
identifying variation in the data, but not on other contract
design elements. For example, in the context of the empirical
exercise in this paper, the key variation we exploit is in the
coverage horizon. One can use such variation to investigate
how health care utilization responds to contracts of different
durations, which is what Cabral (2013) does with similar
variation in a different context. In order to investigate the
impact of other contract design features, such as the response
to the level of the deductible or the coinsurance rate, one
would ideally need independent identifying variation along
each of these dimensions. Such variation does not exist in
the context of the main empirical exercise of this paper, but
it may be feasible in other contexts.
B. Two Different Elasticities Could Be Quite Useful:
An Illustration Using Data from the RAND HIE
To illustrate this general point, we use data from the
famous RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). The
RAND experiment, conducted from 1974 to 1981, ran-
domly assigned participating families to health insurance
plans with different levels of cost sharing. Each plan was
characterized by two parameters: the coinsurance rate (the
share of initial expenditures paid by the enrollee) and the
out-of-pocket maximum, referred to as the maximum dol-
lar expenditure (MDE). Families were randomly assigned to
plans with coinsurance rates ranging from 0% (“free care”)
to 100%. Within each coinsurance rate, families were ran-
domly assigned to plans with MDEs set equal to 5%, 10%, or
15% of family income, up to a maximum of $750 or $1,000.
While differences in MDEs across individual families were
due in part to differences in family income, differences in
average MDE and average end-of-year price across plans can
be treated as randomly assigned.21
Crucially, the experiment randomly assigned two contract
design features: coinsurance rates and MDEs. We view this
as a crucial distinction relative to our primary exercise in this
paper and to much (perhaps most) empirical work examining
moral hazard effects of health insurance. Loosely, if individ-
uals’ response to changes in contract designs is driven by
(at least) two elasticities, with respect to the spot and future
prices, any attempt to predict spending responses to such
changes in contracts would have to be based on (at least) two
elasticity estimates, which could get projected on the elas-
ticities of interest. Thus, even without a complete behavioral
model of medical utilization, reduced-form estimates of the
impact of two different (and independently varied) contract
features could be informative.
In the remainder of this section, we show how we can use
the data and experimental variation from the RAND exper-
iment to implement a test of whether individuals respond
only to the spot price and if we reject it, to estimate the
impact of separate contract design features—in this case,
coinsurance and MDEs—on spending.22 In practice, as we
21 For a brief summary and discussion of the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment, see Aron-Dine, Einav, and Finkelstin (2013). For a detailed
description of the plans and other aspects of the experiment, see Newhouse
and the Insurance Experiment Group (1993).
22 Two of the original RAND investigators, Keeler and Rolph (1988),
also attempt to use the RAND data to test for whether indivdiuals react
only to the spot price, but they use a different empirical strategy. They do
not exploit the variation in the out-of-pocket maximum. Instead, they rely
on within-year variation in how close families are to their out-of-pocket
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Table 6.—Illustrative Exercise Using the RAND HIE Data
Dependent Variable
Any Initial Claima Log Annual Spendingb Annual Spendingc
Regressor OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Coinsurance rate −0.21 −0.25 −1.78 −1.65 −230 777
(0.13) (0.19) (0.73) (1.03) (855) (936)
Share Hit MDE 0.02 0.01 0.20 0.21 525 699
(0.04) (0.04) (0.20) (0.24) (229) (240)
Coinsurance rate × Share Hit MDE 0.18 0.28 1.76 1.40 −561 −3122
(0.33) (0.46) (1.78) (2.53) (2,097) (2,284)
The sample consists of 5,653 family-years (1,490 unique families) in the RAND data in one of the positive coinsurance plans or the free care plan. The table reports results estimating equation (6). The dependent
variable is given in the column heading and the key independent variables in the left-hand column. “Share hit MDE” is the share of families in a given coinsurance and maximum dollar expenditure (MDE) plan who
spend past the MDE during the year. In addition, because plan assignment in the RAND experiment was random only conditional on site and month of enrollment in the experiment, all regressions control for site
and start month fixed effects (see Newhouse et al., 1993, appendix B for more details). All regressions cluster standard errors on the family. In the IV specifications, we instrument for the share of families in a given
coinsurance and MDE plan who hit the MDE with the “simulated” share hitting the MDE; the simulated share is calculated as the share of the full (N = 5,653) sample, which, given their observed spending, would have
hit the MDE if (counterfactually) assigned to the given plan; the coefficient on the instrument in the first stage is 1.05 (standard error 0.003); the F-statistic on the instrument is 120,000. Appendix table A9 provides
more details on the plans in the RAND experiment, the distribution of the sample across the different plans, and the share of families who hit the MDE in each plan.
aThe dependent variable is an indicator for at least one claim made by the employee or any covered family members in the first three months in the plan.
bThe dependent variable is log(s + 1) where s is the total annual medical spending of the employee and any covered family members.
cThe dependent variable is total annual medical spending of the employee and any covered family members.
will show, sample sizes and resultant power issues preclude
us from estimating statistically significant results in this set-
ting. Nonetheless, the example provides a useful template
for how such variation, occurring naturally or through fur-
ther randomized trials, could be used to better understand the
impact of contract design on spending.
Appendix table A9 provides sample counts and various
summary statistics for the RAND plans.23 As the table shows,
average MDEs were considerably higher in plans where the
MDE was set equal to 10% or 15% of family income than
in plans where the MDE was set to 5% of income. These
differences generated corresponding differences in the share
of families hitting the MDE and in expected end-of-year price
(columns 5 and 6).
With no other assumptions than random assignment to
plans, the experiment delivers estimates of spending as a
function of the particular combinations of coinsurance rates
and MDEs that families were randomized into. Appendix
table A10 summarizes these outcomes by cell. As already
mentioned, and illustrated in appendix table A10, the rel-
atively small sample size of the RAND experiment makes
it difficult to draw strong conclusions at this very granular
level. But even if the results in appendix table A10 were less
noisy, it seems unlikely that the objects of interest would be
limited to precisely those combinations of coinsurance rates
and MDEs that were present in the experiment. Presumably
maximum. They test whether spending is higher among families who are
closer to hitting their out-of-pocket maximum, as would be expected, all
else equal, if people respond to dynamic incentives. They make several
modeling assumptions to try to address the (selection) problem that families
with higher underlying propensities to spend are more likely to come close
to hitting their out-of-pocket-maximum. They also assume that individuals
have perfect foresight regarding all the subsequent medical expenses within
a year associated with a given health shock. They conclude that they cannot
reject the null of complete myopia with respect to future health shocks.
23 The original RAND investigators have very helpfully made their data
publicly available. We accessed the data through the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Appendix table A9 omits
RAND’s individual deductible plans, which had coinsurance rates of 0%
for inpatient services and 100% or 95% for outpatient services, because
there was no MDE variation within this coinsurance rate structure.
the researcher would want to use the experiment in order to
provide predictions for other contracts.
Consider, for example, the question of how medical spend-
ing would respond to changes in coinsurance rates in the
context of contracts that had no MDE or a much higher MDE
than observed in the experiment (which, as shown in appen-
dix table A9, had about 20% to 30% of families hitting the
MDE in a given year). The answer cannot be directly “read”
out of the experimental results as it asks about contracts not
observed in the experiment. However, with two sources of
independent variation (in coinsurance rates and MDEs) the
effect of contracts with higher MDEs—or more generally
contracts with different combinations of coinsurance rates
and MDEs—can be estimated by imposing a few additional
assumptions.
We start by noting that the presence of MDEs likely
influences the impact of coinsurance: an individual with
higher coinsurance rates (who would presumably spend less
initially) would likely hit the MDE faster and would there-
fore likely respond more to a change in the MDE. We
therefore construct a new variable, Share_Hit, which is the
share (within a coinsurance-MDE cell) that hits the MDE.
We then project the experimental variation (appendix table
A10) at the (coinsurance rate, MDE) level on variation at
the (coinsurance rate, Share_Hit) level with the following
functional for the regression we estimate:
yfj = η1 × coinsj + η2 × Share_Hitj
+ η3 × coinsj × Share_Hitj + vfj, (6)
where yfj is a measure of medical utilization by family f in
plan j, coinsj is the coinsurance rate of the plan the fam-
ily was randomized into (which is either 0%, 25%, 50%,
or 95%), and Share_Hitj is as defined above (and shown in
appendix table A9).
Table 6 shows these (illustrative and highly noisy) results.
We focus our discussion on the point estimates. The first
column in table 6 uses an indicator for initial claims, as earlier
in the paper. The positive relationship between initial claims
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and the share who hit the MDE indicates a response to
dynamic incentives. If only spot price mattered, initial claims
should have been solely affected by the coinsurance rate. The
second and third columns allow us to assess the effect of com-
bination of contract design options on overall spending, using
both log and level specifications. We see that a lower MDE
or a lower coinsurance rate is associated with lower expen-
diture. This simply reflects an averaging of the experimental
treatment effects. As we emphasized, however, our projec-
tion of the variables onto coinsurance rates and Share_Hit
also allows us to use the experimental variation to predict the
spending effect of other contracts, which are not precisely
part of the experimental treatment. For example, the effect of
a (counterfactual) linear contract could now be read off the
estimates of η1 in table 6, which captures the spending effect
of the coinsurance rate conditional on eliminating the MDE
(or, equivalently, setting Share_Hit = 0).
Such an approach could not always work, of course, and
is limited to contract features for which there is experimental
variation. If one would have liked, for instance, to investigate
the response to adding a deductible, one would presumably
need either additional data with variation in the deductible
amount or to specify and estimate a more complete behav-
ioral model from which one can obtain deeper behavioral
primitives, as described earlier.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we provide evidence that individuals respond
to the dynamic incentives associated with the typical
nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts in the United
States. We do not view our results as particularly surprising.
Like most other economists, we expect people to respond to
incentives and are not terribly surprised when we find that
they do. Yet our results do highlight what we view as a some-
what peculiar feature of the vast amount of work devoted to
the estimation of moral hazard in health insurance. That is,
although most of the literature focuses on estimating a single
elasticity, our results suggest that it is unlikely that a sin-
gle elasticity estimate can summarize the spending response
to changes in health insurance. Our findings underscore that
such an estimate is not conceptually well defined (there are
likely at least two price elasticities that are relevant). As
discussed in the last section, we expect future work in this
area to make progress by either developing and estimating
more complete models of the health utilization decisions or,
alternatively, using independent variation in multiple contract
features to estimate multiple elasticities that together can be
used to approximate more credibly the spending effects of a
richer set of (counterfactual) contract designs.
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